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Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and
Browsewraps:
How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the
Law of the Horse
Cheryl B. Preston*
Eli W. McCann**
{When no contracting] choice [is] really available, it has been and still
is the law's business, and in a case-law system, the judges', to see that
the block to which you are indeed assenting as a transaction is carved
into some approximation of decent balance in its detail.
-Karl Llewellyn, 1939 1
Both private and social contracts are hard to change, but only someone
distracted by babble about "contracts of adhesion" would think this an
objection rather than a benefit.
-Frank Easterbrook, 19982
I.

lNTROLJUCTION

The simple purpose of this Article is to critique recent judicial
liberality toward online contracts, however denominated as "Terms of
Service," "End User License Agreement," "Terms and Conditions," or
"Faustian Bargain," 3 all of which we abbreviate as "TOS." With wanton
irreverence and mixed metaphors, we identify Judge Easterbrook and

* Edwin M. Thomas Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. We thank the following for able and effective comments, research and editing assistance:
Brandon Crowther, Nathan Anderson, Corey Hansen Boyd, Timothy West, Andrew Sellers, and the
editors of the JPL. We dedicate this paper to horses everywhere.
** Eli McCann, J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; B.A.
Brigham Young University. Clerk 2011 2012, Utah Court of Appeals, Hon. Gregory Orme.
1. K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 n.7 (1939) (emphasis
omitted).
2. Frank Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead lland, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121
(199H).
3. "Faust, in the legend, traded his soul to the devil in exchange for knowledge. To 'strike a
Faustian bargain' is to be willing to sacrifice anything to satisfY a limitless desire for knowledge or
power." Faustian Bargain, The American HcritageOIJ New Dictionary of' Cultural Literacy (3d ed.
2005). availahle at http://dictionary.refcrence.com/browse/faustianbargain. To obtain the
information or computer code available beyond a link on a webpagc, many of us will without a
second thought accept a legally enforceable contract that may well include draconian terms.
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ProCD v. Zeidenherg as a key that opened the gates to broader
enforcement of adhesive form contracts generally and allowed the new
ungated form contract to morph into the truly unruly TOS, a beast untied
from the contexts in which form contracts gained (limited) legitimacy.
We review what makes TOS unruly-both in terms of assent and
content-and then argue that, current ccon-crazcd, digital-worshiping
judges (bless their hearts) have adopted a wild horse while forgetting that
such beasts were only originally allowed into civilized communities
because they were in a corral.
In Part II of this Article we review the history of adhesion contracts.
We then critique ProCD and describe how the case's importance has
been unfairly magnified. In Part III we define online wrap contracts and
illustrate what constitutes "assent" to enter such a contract. W c then
illustrate the kinds of problematic clauses that commonly lurk in TOS. In
Part IV we describe the tolerant treatment courts have given TOS in
recent years. We conclude that adhering to a legal concept ripped from
the reins in which it was developed is as irrational as fixing a one-horse
race.

II.

WHAT HORSES AND OFT-CITED CASES HAVE IN COMMON

One of the most famous hypothcticals in the emergence of contract
law involves two men and a horse. The men, cleverly named "A" and
"B," agreed to the purchase and sale of said horse for£ I 0. In 1703, Chief
Justice Holt in Callonel v. Briggs opined: "If I sell you my horse for
[£]10 if you will have the horse, I must have the money; or, if I will have
the money, you must have the horsc." 4 Holt then cites his 170 I opinion
in Thorp v. Thorp (intermittently over the years misspelled as Thorpe v.
Thorpe), where he relied on a less cleverly worded version of the same
hypothetical to hold that, until the horse is delivered, the buyer has no
action for the money. 5 Neither case actually involved horses and both
were breaks from the common law.
Originally, in English common law, B (buyer) was not excused from
paying A (seller) simply because A refused to show up and deliver the
6
horse. This produced an awkward result for B, a state of law lamented

4. (1701)91 Eng. Rer. 104(K.B.) 104; I Salk. 112.113.
5. (170l)XXEng.Rcr.I44X(K.B.): 12Mod.455.
6. See. e.g., llOWARIJ 0. l!Ul'TI'R, MODI Rt-; LAW OJ CONTRACTS~ 10:2 (2011 ): ;\my B.
Cohen. Reviving Jacob andY oungs. Inc. v. Kent. lvfoteriol Breach Doctrine Reconsidered. 42 VII.!..
L. REV. 65. 73 ( 1997); MARY!'< ;\. CIIIRI•LSTEJt-;. CO 'iCE!' IS ;\i\IJ C.\SI ;\:.JAI.YSIS l'i Ti II. LA\\ 01
CONTRACTS 107 (2d ed. 1993). For an astonishingly detailed discussion of the evolution of the law
on dercndent covenants. sec S.J. Stoljar. !Jcpent!ent and fndefh"li<lent f'mmiscs: A Studr in the
l!iston· o/Contract, 2 SYJJNI'Y L. REV. 217 ( 1957). Stoljar. LL.B .. LL.M .. Ph.D. was a rrofcssor at
the Australian National University.
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by Justice Willes in 1744 who notes his objection to such cases but
resigns that "they arc too many to be now over-rulcd."7 He fails to note
Collenel, Thorp, or Oddin v. Duffield, a case decided in Justice Willes'
court of Common Pleas in 1716 that came to the opposite conclusion. x
Not all English jurists were so cowed by these "now too many" cases.
Later, a wildly activist judge, Lord Mansfield, 9 in Kingston v. Preston in
1773 described that mutual promises could be treated as dependent
conditions precedent, even if the parties failed to use any words that
hinted of such intent. 10 He did so without mentioning any prior cases,
agreeing or disagreeing. After comparing the two printed versions of
Kingston and a "lengthy manuscript report" of the case among the Hill
Manuscripts at Lincoln's Inn Library, Professor Oldham suggests the
facts (but not the state of the law) may have been conducive to
Mansfield's holding, but the argument on dependent covenants "made
perfect sense to Mansfield, himself a shrewd man of business." 11 Thus,
this may have been an early case of economic theory trumping law.
Despite its popularity, Kingston v. Preston is almost never cited to
the original 1773 version. 12 Typically it is cited to a quoted excerpt in
Jones v. Barkley. u That opinion illustrates our point that Kingston was
only one of the cases so holding, and clearly not the first. The court in
Jones v. Barkley first cites Turner v. Goodwin 14 for the conditions
precedent conclusion, but then notes in a footnote that the record of the
case may not be very reliable, and the other options are less reliable. 15
This only matters because His Lordship is seventy years late to the

7. Thomas v. Cadwallader, ( 1774) 125 Eng. Rep. 1286 (C.P.) 1288 (K.B); Willes 496, 499.
8. This case is unreported although it is part of the cascnotes of which Justice Willes surely
had access. James Oldham, Detecting Non-Fiction: Sleuthing Among Manuscript Case Report.~ for
What Was Really Said, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN \33, 145 (Chantal Stebbings, ed. 1995).
9. He could probably get away with things because he was "His Lordship."
10. (1773) 98 Eng. Rep. 606 (K.B.) 608; Lofft 194, 198 (Lord Mansfield) (original transcript
under the heading "Covenants."). A summary of the facts and a more thorough explanation of
Mansfield's reasoning is quoted within Jones v. Barkley, (1791) 99 Eng. Rep. 434 (K.B.) 437; 2
Doug. 684, 689. Interestingly, the original 1773 Lofft transcript does not contain some of the points
for which the case is famous, such as the reference to three kinds of dependent covenants and that
dependency can be surmised from the "evident sense and meaning of the parties." !d. at 438.
II. Oldham, supra note 8, at 143 n.43.
12. !d. at 141 n. 43.
13. 99 Eng. Rep. at 437; 2 Doug. at 689.
14. (1714) 88 Eng. Rep. 671 (K.B.); 10 Mod. 153.
15. 99 Eng. Rep. at 436, n.2; 2 Doug. at 689 ("This case of Turner v. Goodwin, as stated in
Viner's Abridgment, vol. 20, p. 183, pl. 9, is still more in point to the present, for, there, the words
are, 'upon his assigning a judgment.' But Viner cites the case from a book of still less authority than
10 Mod. viz. 2 Barnard. 308."). It is a wonder than any cogent principles of law evolved from the
jumble of English case reports. For an interesting account of the incomplete reports of cases,
Mansfield's notes, and Kingston, among other Mansfield cases, see generally Oldham, supra note 8,
at 140-41.
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idea but gets undeserved crcdit. 16 The current Fourth Edition of Williston
on Contracts quotes a 1960 Maryland case, K & G Construction Co. v.
Harris, for the proposition that:
In the case of Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 6X9, decided in 1774
[actually 1773, but who is counting?], Lord Mansfield. contratT to
three centuries of opposing precedents, changed the rule, and decided
that performance of one covenant might be dependent on prior
performance of another, although the contract contained no express
17
condition to that eftect.

Unfortunately, K & G Construction relics entirely on the earlier Revised
or Second Edition of Williston for this same revelation. Jx
The 1962 Third Edition of Williston quotes "a carefully reasoned and
well documented opinion," coincidentally, K & G Construction, which as
we know relics entirely on Williston's earlier edition for the proposition
that "[t]hc case in which [dependent covenants] wasfirst so decided" is
Kingston v. Preston. 19 Thus, this conclusion is quite circular if not
incestuous. And, for overkill, the next three pages in Williston Third
Edition arc virtually a verbatim reproduction of the entire K & G
Construction opmron, 20 repeating the paragraph regarding "three
centuries" but with a footnote only to Kingston, omitting entirely the
Williston Revised Edition internal source citations. 21 Most of us want to
cite ourselves for our own aggrandizement-straight from the horse's
mouth, so to speak; Williston wants to credit a likely unsuspecting
Maryland state judge for an overstatement the judge obtained from
Williston. 22

16. Although Kingston is one of the"[ c ]omparatively few pre-nineteenth-century cases in the
ticld of contract law [that] still makc[s] an appearance in modern cascbooks and textbooks." id. at
140, "'the ideas Mansticld expressed were not new." !d. at 144.
17. 15 RIC liARD A. LORD, WilLISTON or; Co~TRAlTS ~ 44: I, at 7X, ~ 44: I, at XI (4th ed.
2000) (quoting K & (; Constr. Co. v. llarris, 223 Md. 305, I 1>4 A.2d 451 ( 1960)) (emphasis added)
(hereinafter WIII.ISTO;; 4th).
I X. K & G Constr. Co .. 223 Md. at 312 ("'In the early days, it was settled law that covenants
and mutual promises in a contract were primo j{/Cie independent. and that they were to be so
construed in the absence of language in the contmct clearly showing that they were intended to be
dependent. Williston. op. cit .. ,IX 16; Pogc. op. cil., ,1,12944, 2945. In the case of Kingston t'. Presion.
2 Doug. 6X9, decided in 1774, Lord Manstleld, contrary to three centuries of opposing precedents.
changed the rule, and decided that ped(trmancc of one covenant might be dependent on prior
pert(mnance of another, although the contract contained no express condition to that etfcct. Page. op.
cit.. ~2946; Williston. op. cit ..
17. The modern rule, which seems to be of almost universal

,,X

application, is that there is a presumption that mutual promises in a contract arc tkpcndent and an: to

be so regarded. whenever possible. Page. op. cit .. ,j2946; Restatement, Contracts, ,)66. Cf
Williston, op. cit., ,IX 12.").
19. 6 WALTFR H. E. .IAH;U<. WILIISIO:-J ON CONTRACTS~ Xl7. at 2X 29 (3d ed. 1%2)
(emphasis added) (hereinafter WILLISTON 3d).
20. !d. at 30 34.

21. !d. at 33.
22. We're being somewhat less dramatic than Stol,iar: "[T]he f(unous case of Kingslrm

1·.
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On the next page, Williston Third Edition mentions the famous
"Sergeant Williams' Rules" that were appended in 1798 to Pordage v.
24
Cole 23 in a revised edition of the report of this case. Sergeant Williams
adds to a report of Pordage the famous footnote four, one of the seven
wonders of ancient case law. It is more than twice as long as the text of
the opinion and includes five suh:footnotes. In footnote four, as Williston
describes it in the Third Edition, Williams gripes about the existing
cases, and then offers five rules for deciding the issue of which
covenants should be dependent based on the "essence" of the deal and
not the technical words. 25 The fifth rule is cited to Colonel!, Thorpe [sic]
and then several other cases, including Mansfield's much later Kingston.
One modern commentator averred: "The doctrine of the dependency ...
of promises ... has been seriously misunderstood and much neglected,
and ... has in many ways remained where Serjeant [sic] Williams left it
more than 150 years ago. " 26 Williston Third Edition seems to agree,
stating that Sergeant Williams' Rules "remained for years the recognized
5,·tatement of the law and acquired judicial authority by their adoption by
the courts," and then Williston quotes a summary of the five rules fromyou guessed it-K & G Construction? 7 The bottom line is that Lord
Mansfield was not first nor was his the most careful and thorough
statement of the dependent covenants doctrine. 28
Early American cases cite Pordage v. Cole (intending, no doubt, the
29
version of that case in which footnote four was stuffed a century later),
as the source of the doctrine Williston credits to Lord Mansfield-unless,
of course, they cite the even earlier Ughtred's Case from 1591,30 or the

Preston. [is] a case often believed to be the chief climacteric in the history of concurrent conditions.
This is. however. a belief, which ... is a gross oversimplification." Supra note 6, at 238. "Another
view is that the dependent-independent doctrine remained virtually unchanged from the sixteenth
century until the time of Lord Mansticld. The subsequent developments abundantly prove that this
view is quite 1-erious/v mistaken." /d. at 219 n.16 (emphasis added).
23. ( 1669) X5 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B.); I Wms. Saund. 319.
24. WiLLISTON 3d, supra note 19, ~ 819, at 37 n.7; Stoljar, supra note 6, at 228 n.76.
25. WiLLISTON 3d, supra note 19.
26. Stoljar, supra note 6, at 217.
27. WILI.ISTON 3d, supra note 19, at~ 820, at 38-39.
28. Although WILLISTON's claim that Mansticld overruled "three centuries of opposing
precedents" is not accurate, WiLLISTON is not the only source that credits Lord Mansfield in
Kingston. See, e.g., Clarence D. Ashley, Brillon v. Turner, 24 YALE L.J. 544 (1915) ("It is not
disputed that this doctrine of implied conditions first arose in Kingston v. Preston.") (no citation in
original). CY: Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and the Development of
Contract Law in Seventeenth Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 35, 123 (1993) ("[T]he trend in
favor of constructive allocation culminate[ d] ... in Kingston v. Preston.").
29. "Because Serjeant [sic] Williams annexed his famous note to this case, the decision
gained enormous prominence, though its precise historical significance remained misunderstood."
Stoljar, supra note 6, at 228 n.76.
30. ( 1591) 77 Eng. Rep. 425 (C.P.); 7 Co. Rep. 9b.
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more popular Thorp v. Thorp from 170 I, in which Judge Holt opined at
length on the issue and included-with a plethora of other interesting,
but long since forgotten, hypothcticals-A and B's horse: "where a man
agrees to give so much money for a horse, it is plain he meant to have the
horse first, and, therefore, he says the money shall be given for the
horsc." 32
This famous horse for £I 0 rises again in Charles Addison's A
Treatise on the ],awol Contracts and Rights and Liahilities ex contractu
in 184 7 quoted from Callonel. "" The horse hypothetical then reappears in
34
our 20 I 0 edition contracts casebook, which credits Lord Mansfield's
too-little-too-late opinion in King.<,·ton, in which horses arc not discussed,
with establishing the principle of dependent promises.
One of the most famous contracts metaphors also involves a horse.
35
In Richardson v. Mellish, an 1824 Kings Bench case that, incidentally,
involved the interpretation of a dense chunk of preprinted boilerplate, 3r'
Judge Burrough said, "!, for one, protest ... against arguing too strongly
upon [invalidating a contract on the grounds of] public policy;-it is a
very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know
where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. " 37 Professor
David Freidman reports that "Judge Burrough's enduring 'unruly horse'
metaphor for the public-policy defense to contract ... appears in the
contracts literature, in contracts treatises, and in case law." 1 x For
instance, with considerable creativity, Percy Winfield elaborated:
That [horse] has proved to be a rather obtrusive, not to say, blundering,
steed in the law reports .... And at times the horse has looked like
even less accommodating animals. Some judges have thought it more
like a tiger, and have refused to mount it at all, perhaps because they
feared the fate of the young lady of Riga. Others have regarded it like
Salaam's ass which would carry its rider nowhere. But none ... ha[ve]
looked upon it as a Pegasus that might soar beyond the momentary

31. (1701) XX Eng. Rep. 144X (K.B.): 12 Mod. 455.
32.

!d. at 1453: 12 Mod. at 464.

33. CHARLES ADDISON. A TREATISE
IIAHII.ITII,s EX COV'/R,ICTU X65 (I X47).

0:\ Till·.

LAW 01

CONTRACTS AND Rl<iii"IS .\';j)

34. BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSIIAW. CONTRACTS C'ASFS. DISCL SSION. AND PROBLI·MS
6XO X1 (2d cd. 20 I 0).
1

35. (I X24) 130 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P.); 2 Bing. 229.
36. In this case involving a dispute over the legality of a contract between a ship's captain
and the owner of the ship. Justice Burrough relied on the dense standard legalese t(mnd in that ship
company's bylaws. !d. at 303: 2 Bing. at 252. The "bye-law" contains 205 words. divided only by
three sets of": and." In addition, it includes this nice tidbit "moreover. the respective parties to such

contract receiving, paying, or giving, or contracting to pay, receive, or give, shall severally pay
damages to the Company." !d. at 294 n.a: 2 Bing. at 230 n.a.
37. !d. at 303.
3X. David A. Friedman, Bringing Order to Con/mc/s against Puhlic Polin·. I' I A. S 1. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming). ovailahle at http://ssrn.com/abstract--190X026 (internal citations omitted).

I]
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Karl Llewellyn also favored horse trades as the structure for
understanding contract law, although his "buyers and these sellers are so
definitely not A and B but human beings." 40 In discussing the application
of warranties to wares (also known as non-critter goods) in Across Sales
on Horseback, he challenges the assumption that "the conjunction of the
horse-idea, the King's Bench, a ware of commerce, two dealers, and the
41
year 1802, ... provide a start behind which one does not go back." The
same year in The First Struggle to Unhorse Wares, Llewellyn addresses
"cases which can stand being read in the light of whiskey, the boasting
of a little man away from home, and unlucky gambling at the tavern
[and which show] ... the need to give a stranger astride your wellknown horse some papers to keep the Society for the Prevention and
Detection of Horse Thieves off his neck ...." 42
Thus we see that "horse trades," defined as a "negotiation
43
accompanied by shrewd bargaining and reciprocal concessions," are a
staple of the formation of contract law. Now, however, the dashing, glib,
and famous spokesperson for economics, Judge Easterbrook, has insulted
the role of the horse in law-twice. In CyberSpace and the Law ol the
Horse, Judge Easterbrook "welcomed" 44 a crowd of cyberlaw gecks by
comparing the ridiculousness of teaching a course on cyberlaw to the
absurdity of teaching one on the law of the horse, quipping "[w ]hen
asked to talk about 'Property in Cyberspace,' my immediate reaction
was, 'Isn't this just the law of the horse?'" 45
The same year in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 46 Judge Easterbrook
suggested that hobbling the frce-for-a11 of rolling contract formation
"would return transactions to the horse-and-buggy age," 47 which-as a
39. Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 91
( 1928) (quoted in Friedman, supra note 38); see also John Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly llorse:
Public Po/i<~\' in the Law of Contract, 30 CAMHRIDGE L.J. 144 (1972); Dan L. McNeal, Judicially
Determined Public Policy: Is "The Unrulv llorse" Loose in Michigan?, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
143 (1996).
40. K. N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV L. REV. 725, 728 (1939). Who is
to say that the two human beings who arc buying and selling a horse for £I 0 were not actually
named "A" and "B"?
41. JJ. at 737 (emphasis in original).
42. K. N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873, 881
(1939).
http://www. merriam-webster. com/ dictionary I
43. MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
horse%20tradc (last visited Oct. 23, 20 I I).
44. CvberSpace and the Law of the Horse was the title of Judge Easterbrook's welcoming
remarks at a "Law and CyberSpace" conference, which were later published. Benjamin Means
characterized them as "[s]ome of the least welcoming remarks ever." Benjamin Means, Forward: A
Lensji1r Law and Entrepreneurship, 6 01110 ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. I, 5 (20 II).
45. 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208 ( 1996 ).
46. 86F.3d 1447(7thCir.l996).
47. hi. at 1452.
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matter of contract law principles-he apparently believes is a bad thing.
Actually, the basic transactions in horses gave rise to many wise legal
precepts that have been proven by time and trial. What reason have we to
throw out horse-and-buggy law with the bathwatcr because we ever so
recently moved into a digital age? Ironically, in Law of the Horse, Judge
Easterbrook abjures cutting the law free from the broader historical
context and foundational principles just because we arc talking about
cyberspace, and in ProCD he rushes to cut away the broader historical
context and foundational principles to create a result he thinks is
necessary to foster digital markcts. 4 x
This all goes to show two salient principles discussed in this Article.
First, the statements of important people arc given more credit than the
same or better ideas from unimportant people. This fact is amply
evidenced in legal scholarship by citations to certain authors even if they
didn't say it first, better, or correctly. More importantly, this fact is
evidenced by reliance on cases such as ProCD v. Zeidenherl~ for
applications expanded beyond what was required by the case, and the
general response to any writings of Judge Easterbrook. Second, as the
years pass, the particulars of case precedents get muddled and the
nuances lost, thus later courts sometimes pick up a partial idea or rule
and forget its context, justifications, and penumbra. One might say they
adopt half a horse, and we will argue that the half that modern courts
have adopted regarding contracts of adhesion is not the front half

A. Zeidenherg 's Fancy Thefi
Similar to Lord Mansfield and Kingston v. Preston," 0 the Seventh
1
2
Circuit in ProCD v. Zeidenherl and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. " served
up extraordinarily influential opinions, even if their fame is undeserved.
In both cases the court enforced terms received by the other party after
contract formation occurred under traditional principles. Commentary on
ProCD is so plentiful that any attempt to further discuss it seems like
beating a dead horse. But we argue that although ProCD's "rule" is
frequently cited, the context of the case is frequently ignored and its
importance is overstated.
In ProCD, Matthew Zcidcnbcrg purchased software in a retail

4X. !d. at 1447.
49. !d.
50. (1773) 9X Eng. Rep. 606 (K.H.) 6XX; Loftl 194. I9X. For issues regarding the proper
citation for this case. sec supro note I 0.
51. X6 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
52. I 05 F.3d I 147 (7th Cir. 1997) (cert. denied. 522 U.S. XOX ( 1997 )).
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store. 53 Notwithstanding Judge Easterbrook's offhanded comment
suggesting that the contract formed when Zcidcnberg accepted the
store's offer to purchase, 54 in a typical retail real-world sale, the offer is
made by the potential buyer and the store clerk chooses to accept or
not. 55 In any event, when Zeidenbcrg walked out of the store, a contract
had formed under traditional contract law. The license with the terms of
the contract was not accessible until the shrinkwrap was broken, the box
was opened, and the disk's information was accessed on Zeidenberg's
computcr. 56 At some point, Matthew Zcidenberg decided to play the
57
ponies and copy ProCD's database and sell it to ProCD's market base.
Typical practice in the sale of software when ProCD was decided
had been to use a "shrinkwrap" contract, where the license terms arc
visible on the box under the plastic wrap so the potential purchaser can
consider them prior to making an offer to buy. The court in ProCD found
that requiring software vendors to include all of the license terms on the
box was unrealistic and inefficient. 58 We believe the seven-by-nine-bythree-inch box in which software is sold would provide plenty of space if
the terms were limited to the reasonable number of terms necessary to
protect intellectual property written in plain English. Nonetheless, Judge
Easterbrook held that, given the space constraints, the terms could be
introduced after traditional formation as long as the purchaser had some
(maybe only theoretical) opportunity to return the software for some
53. 86 r.3d at 1450.
54. !d.
55. It is true that some courts have looked at the store's act of placing an item for purchase on
a shelf as the initial offer, but the context of these cases matters. Many cases that analyze contract
formation in this way concern 42 U.S.C. § I 983 discrimination allegations or serious tort injuries,
where an intent to enter a contract is relevant for finding liability. In this context, we imagine these
courts have a special interest in enlarging the concept of how a contract forms in order to pull in
more conduct that may be considered discriminatory. See Gentry v. Hershey Co., 687 F. Supp. 2d
711 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (viewing product placement on a shelf in a § 1983 case as the store's
"offer"); Domino's Pizza v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (same); Barker v. Allied Supermarket,
596 P.2d 870 (Okl. 1979) (discussing contract formation in a negligence case tor injuries resulting
fi-om a soft drink bottle explosion). However, contract law professors know that placing an item on a
shelf is like a price quote, advertisement, or invitation to bid, leaving the customer to make the actual
ofter by bringing the item to the store clerk for purchase. Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and
Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. I I 81, 1181 (20 I 0) (Judge
Easterbrook's statement "is contrary to the general rule that advertisements and the display of goods
are invitations for offers."); Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 839 40
(2007) ("[P]ayment tor the software constitute[s] an ofter that the store would accept by taking
payment (as typically understood under traditional contract law)." (citing Deborah W. Post,
Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook, 16
TOURO L. REV. 1205, 1226 (2000) ("[A ]s most tirst year law students can tell you, a display of
merchandise in a store window, and one supposes on a shelf: is nothing more than an 'invitation to
offer."'))); see also Klecek v. Gateway, Inc., I 04 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000) ("In typical
consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the offeree.").
56. Pro CD. 86 F.3d at 1449 50.
57. !d. at 1450.
58. !d. at 1451.

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

10

lVolumc 26

period after being made aware of the terms.'~ This is a classic case of
putting the cart before the horse.
Rather than resolve the case through the mechanism established in
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) for dealing with later additions
of new and different tcrms/' 0 Judge Easterbrook first articulated the result
he believed he had to obtain for purposes of supporting market
economics, and then simply declared that the terms were enforceable
without much effort to locate a rule somewhere in traditional contract
law. 61 His result has come to be called a "terms later" or "rolling''
contract, characterized by what might be considered a series of offers and
acccptanccs, 62 although that was not the explanation given by Judge
Easterbrook.
Further, the assumptions upon which ProCD rests may not be
realistic; Judge Easterbrook suggested that as long as the consumer has
an opportunity to return the product within a stated number of days after
the terms arc revealed to the purchaser, it is not inconsistent with notions
of voluntary assent to find that the consumer has manifested assent by
purchasing the product and later finding the terms inside the package, or
even later finding the terms when the disk is inserted in the computer.(,,
However, real world practice may show that returning a small product
through a retailer is impossible and returning it through the product
manufacturer is such a hassle that it may as well be impossible. We arc
aware of no one who purchased boxed software and has successfully
returned an opened product. Moreover, the plodding plug who docs not
get around to opening the box and loading the program for more than a
month after the retail sales receipt will have a battle proving the product
was returned within the time frame of thirty-days after reading the terms.
Nonetheless, Judge Easterbrook seemingly has no qualms with binding
that consumer anyway because some written promise that a product may
be returned is enough for the non-return of the item to indicate the
consumer's final act of assent. (' 4
Next, Judge Easterbrook describes the kind of market disaster that
would flow from transactions where warranties arc neither limited nor
waived by contract, because there is no enforceable contract. In
transactions "unfettered by terms," sellers may be subject to "a broad
warranty and must pay consequential damages for any shortfalls in

59.
60.
61.
62.
2005).
63.
64.

1452 53.
~ 2 207(2) (3) (2009)
ProCD, X6 !'.3d at 1453 55.
Sec. e.g., lliggs v. Auto. Warranty Corp. of Am .. 134 Fed. App'x. X2X. X31 (6th Cir.

h{at

U.C.C.

ProCIJ, X6 !'.3d at 1451 52.
Sec id
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performance," which "would drive prices through the ceiling or return
transactions to the horse-and-buggy age. " 65 Thus, he asserts that an
economic benefit of enforcing rolling contracts is that the software
provider may waive or limit warranties. The risk to the software market
because of warranties implied under the U.C.C. is somewhat less drastic
than Judge Easterbrook fears. The applicability of the U.C.C. to items
primarily purchased for the intangible intellectual property, rather than
the tangible disk, is still disputed, 66 although, politics aside, it seems
quite obvious that the "predominant purpose" 67 of the transaction, as well
as the "gravamen" 6 s of ProCD's complaint lie squarely in intangible
property and not in "goods" so the U.C.C. would not apply. Of course,
warranties may perhaps arise outside of the U.C.C. 69
More importantly, limiting the kinds of terms in adhesion form
contracts that will be enforced, giving adequate notice of the included
terms at formation, and requiring some knowing assent will not create
the monster of transactions "unfettered by terms." 70 A transaction can
adhere to the principles of contract formation and the bounds of fairness
without being stripped of all terms.
ProCD and the line of cases that have followed stress the economic
inefficiencies that would result if the courts were to hold the parties to

65. !d. at 1452.
66. The Unitimn Commercial Code (U.C.C.), Article 2, applicable to transactions in
"goods," implies warranties for product performance in any transaction for "goods." §§ 2-314, 2-315
( 1995). Under the proposed Revised U.C.C. Article 2, "information" is excluded from the definition
of "goods," and the official comments make clear that downloadable software is excluded. See
U.C.C. ~ 2-103(l)(k) & cmt. 7 (2009). Although the revised Article 2 has been withdrawn, the
existing definition implies that information is excluded because it is intangible. However, no
consensus has formed on whether software delivered by disk is "goods" subject to Article 2 or even
whether a license is a transaction in goods. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma,
2008 BYU L. REV. II 03, 1120 (2008); Systems Unlimited, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 228 F. App'x
854. 854, 2007 WL I 047064 (II th Cir. 2007) (holding that the "sale of intellectual property was not
a 'transaction in goods' subject to the U.C.C., under California law"); Specht v. Nctscape Commc'ns
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 n.l3 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting the problems associated with applying the U.C.C.
to software licensing). But see, Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that the U.C.C. applies to contracts dealing in software); Bray Intern., Inc. v. Computer
Assocs. Inter., No. CIV H-02-0098, 2005 WL 3371875, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining that in
Texas, the U.C.C. applies to software licensing); Ilou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.3d
I 03, I 08 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). For a thorough discussion of whether the U.C.C. applies to online
access contracts, sec Ray Nimmer, A Modern Template For Discussion, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J.
623 (2004).
67. For an explanation of the application of the predominant purpose test, see WILLISTON
4th, supra note 17, § 26:20.
68. WILLIAM D. IIAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES§ 2-102:04, at 12 ( 1984)
(explaining the usc of the gravamen test compared to the predominant purpose test).
69. Lothar Determann & Gary Shapiro, llandling Open Source Software Risks In
Commercial and M & A Transactions, 956 PLI/PAT 227.231-36 (Jan. Feb. 2009) (describing the
kinds of implied warranties that arise even in open source transactions where no express warranties
are made).
70. ProCD v. Zcidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
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standards that would not allow contracting to be done in this way. 71 This
idea is that the market efficiently produces products and services and that
these quick contracts and loose requirements promote economic
efficiency. Many commentators buy into these ideas, arguing that
standard non-negotiable contracts presented in the ways they were in
72
Pro CD and are in TOS reduce transaction costs. Others, however,
argue that such contracts are counter-productive to promoting economic
efficiency-that they actually cause negative behavior and reduce the
effects of consistency and predictability that contract law is intended to
provide. n However, the general trend over the last decade leans toward
allowing whatever the lawyers for software companies think up for the
74
sake of economic efficiency, rather than put pressure on contract
drafters to "carve some approximation of decent balance in its detail" as
75
demanded by Karl Llewellyn.
In ProCD, Easterbrook let his horse sense about what markets
require trump the niceties of contract doctrine. If that isn't an activist
judge, what is? Judge Easterbrook's temptation was not a new one. In the
1824 "unruly horse" case, Chief Justice Best pointedly held that the
judges should not reach results they desire based on notions of what is
best for society (i.e. public policy or market efficiency) but instead
76
should only look to established law. Courts do not have, "the means of
bringing before them all those considerations which ought to enter into
77
the judgment of those who decide on questions of policy."
Nonetheless, particularly in the context of applying contract law in
technology transactions, subsequent courts have shown considerable
deference to the
importance of supporting
an
emerging
technology/digital market, rather than pressuring businesses to draft non-

71. Si!l! id. at 1450 52.
72. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner. One-Sidi!d Contrac/s in Comfwlitit·c
Consumer Murkl!ls. 104 MICII. L. REV. X27. X29 (200(>).
73. Roger C. Bern. "Ti'i'fns Later" Contracting: Bad Fconomics, Had Mom/1·, all< Ia Bud
Idea For a Uniji1rm Law, Judge Eusterhrook Notwirhstunding. 12 .I.L. & Poi.'Y 641. 643 44 (2004)
(arguing that .Judge Easterbrook's holding may actually "increase[] transaction cosh. enhance[]
hold-up or opportunistic behavior by vendors. and result[] in inefficiencies and as distributional
unfairness by systematically redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors"): sec afw1 Glynn
Lunney. Protecting Digiral Works. Copvright or Contract". I Tt!l.. .I. TI·CII. & IN 111.1 .. PROP. I. X
n.3X ( 1999) ("For ProC'D to attempt such a price discrimination scheme. it must have some degree of
monopoly in the market ti.>r telephone listings. Given such monopoly. there is little reason to expect
the market to com.train effectively ProCD's attempt to impose improrer and inet11cient terms in the
use agreement." (citing Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde. lnrert·ening in Markers on the Basis of
!mperji·crlnfimnation: A Ll!gal and £co nomic Anah·sis, 127 U. l'A. L. RI·.V. (>30. 659 <>2 ( 1979)) ).
74. Sec inji-a Part IV (discussing current conrt trends with respect to online agreements).
75. Llewellyn. supra note I. at 703 n.7.
76. Richardson v. Mellish. (I X24) 130 Eng. Rep. 294 (K.B.) 29X: 2 Bing. 229.240.
77. !d. at 299, 2 Bing. at 242.
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negotiable contracts that reflect reasonable and fair terms. 7x Such
deference seems most defensible when it is directed at protecting mental
horse power, or the intellectual property interests, from those who would
expropriate the significant investment of others in developing
technological innovations, even when such material, like the database in
ProCD, could not be copyrighted. Clearly, Matthew Zeidenberg should
not be allowed to purchase a much subsidized consumer copy of a
database developed with great time and expense so he could use it to take
ProCD's profitable customers. Such protection is especially important
when the intellectual property is code or a digital copy that can be
reproduced with almost no cost or effort and without losing quality. But
now the zeal in protecting innovation and intellectual property through
the enforcement of licensing terms is aimed with equal vigor at contract
clauses covering matters unrelated to the limited license to use
intellectual property.
The ideas generated from ProCD were not consistently received by
other courts. For instance, in Utah in 1997, one federal district court
rejected a similar licensing agreement where the terms arrived after
purchase when the box was delivered. 79 The court suggested that Utah
did not, and only a minority of the courts would ever, follow the Seventh
Circuit's precedent in ProCD.xo Rut over time the philosophical
approach of ProCD went from a trot to a gallop. This may be a classic
example of the Kingston v. Preston principle: a person of great renown
or other hot credentials may either copy an earlier court or just get it
wrong, but upon his saying so the idea becomes the eat's meow. 81 What
subsequent courts seemed to remember about ProCD is the economic
necessity of enforcing contracts to protect a technology market even if
traditional contract doctrine is sacrificed in the process. 82 What most do
not remember are the limitations of ProCD's holding and the fact that the
issue involved was theft of intellectual property rather than a full waiver
of liability or the right to modify without notice.
In any event, greasing the skids for the powerful actors who take
advantage of consumers may not be in society's interest. Certainly,
European Union lawmakers are less willing to throw consumers to the

78. Sec, e.g .. cases discussed in Part IV infra.
79. Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., 25 r. Supp. 2d 12 I 8, I 230 (D. Utah I 997), vacated in
part on other ground1·, I '11,7 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999).
'11,0. !d.
'!',I. "Horse's whinny" just didn't work.
82. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., I 05 F.3d 1147, 1149 50 (7th Cir. 1997) (approving
Pro CD because of the practical benefits of not having to explain to each customer the meaning of
terms and noting the need to acknowledge practical and economic considerations in contract law
generally, not simply as it pertains to licensing agreements).
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wolvcs.x 3 The sense that ProCD somehow validated a brave new world
of enforcing overreaching adhesive contracts against the powerless is not
true.

B. Opening the Gatewayj'or All Form Contracts
One would think that Judge Easterbrook would get off his high horse
there, but one year later in Hill v. Gateway,x 4 Judge Easterbrook wrote
another opinion in a case like ProCD. Gatewc~v was similar to ProCD in
that the terms arrived after contract formation and there was some
technology involved (although this time it was hardwarc).x" But this case
was unlike ProCD in that the Gateway dispute had nothing to do with the
technology or an expropriation of intellectual property. The Seventh
Circuit could have distinguished this case, but instead it chose to ratify
the principle of a "rolling" or "terms-later" contract, without offering
1
much more in terms of doctrinal explanation. x' In Gateway, Hill ordered
merchandise over the phone and was not read, or told about, any specific
terms.x 7 Later Hill's order arrived with accompanying terms that noted
that the contract would be "accepted" and therefore effective if Hill did
not return the order within thirty days. xx Hill later complained about his
order after the thirty-day period, and argued that he was given no proper
notice of terms prior to his purchase and therefore should not be bound
9
by the thirty-day deadline.x
Judge Easterbrook disagreed, finding this form of transaction to be
economically necessary and sufficiently fair to the consumer who had the
opportunity to review the terms and respond accordingly but simply
90
failed to do so in this case. The court further justi tied its decision
through analogy, arguing that "fp]ayment preceding the revelation of full
terms is common for air transportation, insurance, and many other
endeavors" and claiming it was impractical to find a way to inform
customers of all terms prior to product purchasing. 'JI
Both ProCD and Gateway give particular punctuation to the
42
importance of the technology market. Judge Easterbrook relics on the

X3. S<!c Jane K. Winn & Hrian 1f. Rix. !Jin·1ging Pasp<!ctil·cs on 1:/cctmnic Crmtmcting In
The U.S. and F.U, 54 Cu•v. ST. L. REV. 175 (200!>).
R4. 105 f.3d I 147 (7th Cir. 1997).
XS. !d. at 114X.
X6. !d. at 1150.
X7. !d. at I 14X.

XX. !d.
X9. !d.
90. !d. at I 149.
91. !d.
92. !d. at 1150; ProCD v. Zeidenbcrg, X6 f.3d 144 7, 1449 50 (7th Cir. 19% ).
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assumption that such contracting serves economic efficiencies and,
ultimately, reduces prices for customers and increases availability. These
assumptions are strongly supported by some commentators. 93 Others are
cynical about this economic analysis and the comparative weighing of
business and consumer benefits. 94 Further, cost savings may increase
profits rather than reduce price.
C. The Gate Keeper

Following this discussion of ProCD morphed into Gateway is a good
place to briefly tarry on the relevance of the opinions' author. Like Lord
Mansfield, much of what Judge Easterbrook says gets attention merely
because he said it. In 2006 Professor Elhaugc made overt what many
scholars know: "Judging by the literature, academic norms now require
me to make the obligatory reference to Judge Easterbrook's famous
disparaging quip comparing cybcrlaw to the 'Law of the Horsc.'" 95
Scholars are drawn to respond to Judge Easterbrook's opinions like fancy
hats to the Kentucky Derby. The magnitude of law review citations is
staggering: as of November 20 II, 1,023 law review and journal articles
cite ProCD, 96 and 464 law review articles cite Gateway. 97 One such
article, entitled "Terms Later" Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad
Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook
Notwithstanding, 9x captures the essence of the situation; the author felt
compelled to frame his economics analysis against Judge Easterbrook
who takes a prominent and conspicuous personal role alongside the
issue. Had a less iconic figure opined on the subject, the title could have
been three words shorter. 99
As an example, scholars feel pressure to respond to every facet of
Judge Easterbrook's cyberlaw analysis including his famous, cyber-horse
comparison. Judge Easterbrook's analogy of cyberlaw to "the law of the

93. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 72, at 82S-29 (arguing that there are advantages
lower transaction and agency costs, which lead to lower-priced goods and services to having
standard non-negotiable contracts in a competitive marketplace, and claiming that the majority of
courts agree and therefore arc willing to enforce contracts of adhesion).
94. See supra note 73.
95. Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field ofLaw?, 41 WAKE FOREST
L.REV.365,368(2006).
96. Data was gathered using WcstlawNext search for "86 F.3d 1447 ." See
https://a.next.westlaw.com (follow "Citing References" hyperlink; select "Secondary Sources"
hyperlink; select "Law Reviews" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
97. Data was gathered using WestlawNext search for "1 05 F.3d 1147." See
https://a.ncxt. westlaw.com (follow "Citing References" hyperlink: select "Secondary Sources"
hyperlink: select "Law Reviews" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
98. Bern, supra note 73.
99. And shorter means more citations as it is faster to type.
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horse" seems to require scholars to justify themselves against his
.. .
.
. too narrow. lOll 8 asc d on
cntiCism
t hat w hatcvcr fiIc ld t h cy arc toutmg
IS
101
this quip, one scholar discusses whether the law of the horse exists - a
question that would surely not have been asked, let alone answered in
detail, except for Judge Easterbrook uttering the magic phrase.
Essentially, Judge Easterbrook's touch turned something as innocuous
and mild as horse law into a standard simply because the phrase came
. ht c.trom thc horsc's mout h. 102
stra1g
Many scholars feel forced to justify their views against Judge
Easterbrook's passing statement, thus, the ncar violent response to Judge
Easterbrook's criticism. Intcrcstingly, a well-crafted and researched
criticism from another source has fleeting effect-shorter than a horse
103
racc.
Some scholars have couched their entire thesis in terms of Judge
104
Easterbrook's observations.
Ill. A VET'S PRE-PURCHASE EXAMINATION OF UNRULY TOS
In spite of the warning "don't look at gift horse in the mouth,"

Equine Legal Solutions tells us that "[ilf you arc acquiring a horse, you
should have a pre-purchase veterinary examination. Period. Even if the
105
horse is frec."
No better advice could be given a person thinking of
purchasing online products or services, even if the services arc free. The
recommended veterinary examination isn't always a pretty thing. Aside

I 00. Sec. e.g .. Elhaugc. supra note 95; James (irimmchnan. The Stmcture of Search r:ngine
93 !OW/\ L. Rf'V. I. 5 n.7 (explaining that his thesis is not undermined by Judge Easterbrook's
law-ot~thc-horse standard because the claim of the paper is not that there should be a distinct body of
search engine law); Marcelo llalpern & Ajay K. Mehrotra. Hrploring Legal !1oundarin· Within
(\'iJerspacc: What Lmv Controls in u Glohal Marketplace:'. 21 U. Pi\. J. l~T·I. Ecor-;. L. 523.534
(2000) (disagreeing with Judge Easterbrook by arguing that "the Internet should be aprroachcd and
respected as a unique place with ib own set of social norms and community standards''): Kenneth D.
Katkin. C\'hcr LaH': Prohlcms nllntemet Go!'i'rnancc. 2X N. KY. L. Rt'V. (J5!J, 656 57 (2001)
(attacking "Judge Easterbrook's usc of equestrian law as the paradigmatic example of a subject so
excessively shallow and narrow that it cannot yield any unitying principles when studied").
l~aw.

I 0 I. Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith. r:ntrefJrctWt!l·s on 1/orsehad: Rc/lcctirms on the
Organization ojLaH·. 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 76 77 (200X).
I 02. Cheryl B. Preston, C\'herfnjimts. 39 PEt' I'. L. Rt:V. 225, 230 n.29 (20 12) (brictly
describing the "tortured interchange" spurred by Judge Easterbrook's article citing responses and
responses to the responses).
I 03. See, e.g., Ann Bartow. Review, A Portroit olthe f11temet us u Young Alan. I OX Mtcll. L.
REV. 1079, 1099 (2010) (noting that "the eommunity of cyberlaw scholars that [others] pay[]
attention to is small . . . . The cyberlaw discourse among legal scholars has been insular from the
very beginning of the tlcld.
.).
104. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Tmching Cr·halull'. 52 Sr. Lmrts li. L.J. 74'!. 749 50
(explaining that "Judge Easterbrook's observations were correct" but tlnding that "Judge
Easterbrook reached the wrong conclusion").
I 05. Pre-Purchase
VeterinuJT
Ewms,
E<)lii'JI·:
LHiM.
SOI.l'TIO'JS,
http://www.equinelegalsolutions.com/pre-purchasevctexams.html (last visited Oct. 2X. 20 It).
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from looking in a horse's mouth to sec if it is "long in the tooth," 106
blood, urine, and other bodily fluids are involved. 107 But it needs to be
done.
In this Part we define, dissect, and trace the evolution of the unruly
horse that is a TOS. This Part discusses the progress of adhesion
contracting onto the Internet, first as clickwrap agreements and then
browsewrap agreements. We begin by briefly explaining what each of
these general terms encompasses, and what acts operate as the supposed
manifestation of assent online. Then we briefly consider the kinds of
terms regularly included in TOS. We conclude with a comparison of
online contracting and the realities of contracting in the pre-Internet
world in which various core legal doctrines have developed and are now
warped.
A. "Stocking Up" on Polo Wraps 11111

Courts began first to deal with online transacting after a movement
involving sales of compactly packaged software on a disc (encased with
more legal terms than a bad episode of Law and Order). Enamored with
Judge Easterbrook and remembering the bare holding of ProCD rather
than the full context, courts embraced rolling contracts, excusing
criticism that the customer did not even have access to the agreement
until after contract formation. As we will now discuss, courts justified
this seemingly counter-intuitive paradox by using many of the same
economic arguments already used to justify standard form contracts for
decades.
As a matter of definition, "clickwrap agreements" require users to
click a link before proceeding to usc the services or place an order.
Originally, clickwraps typically required the user to knowingly move a
cursor and click a link clearly labeled to indicate that a click would
constitute acceptance of terms that were shown. But even with a clearly
I 06. This means too old. "Horses's teeth, unlike humans', continue to grow with age. They
also wear down with usc, but the changes in the characteristics of the teeth over time make it
possible to make a rough estimate of a horse's age by examining them. There are various similar
Latin phrases dating back to the 16th century. The gap between these and the tirst citation of the
English version - in 1852, make it likely that 'long in the tooth' was coined independently from
those earlier Latin sayings. That earliest citation is in Thackeray's The History of ffenry Esmond.
Esq. and refers to a woman rather than a horse . . . ." THE PHRASE FINDER,
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/long-in-the-tooth.html (last visited Oct. 28, 20 II).
I 07. For instance, Equine Legal Solutions suggests: "For all stallions, even colts of a relatively
young age, this examination should include whether both testicles have descended. For stall ions of
breeding age (e.g., two years old and older), semen should be collected and tested for viability and
motility." Pre-Purchase Veterinary Exams, supra note 105.
I 08. Katherine Blocksdorf, Choosing Leg Wraps or Bandages, About.com Horses, available
at http://horses.about.com/od/choosingandusingtack/a/choosinglcgwrapsorbandages.htm (last visited
Oct. 28, 20 II).

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

18

[Volume 26

communicated set of terms and a clearly labeled button, commentators
have questioned how a mere click is the equivalent to signing an
agreement in paper contracting. 109 The general term has stuck and been
applied by some to any click on any term that suggests moving forward
to another page, 110 even if terms arc nowhere to be seen and the button is
labeled with only "continue" or some other words unrelated to becoming
legally bound. Although a few wcbpagcs take steps to encourage users to
actually sec some of the terms and maybe even scroll through them,
many wcbpagcs do not show the terms and some give little clue about
where to find the terms that supposedly leap into effect with a click, as
we will discuss in part 8 below.
Some wcbpagcs do not require the consumer to click to accept an
agreement. The online service providers claim that by using the page the
user became legally bound to a contract subject to extensive terms that
exist somewhere on the website, but not necessarily on a page that the
user will sec in the ordinary course. Browscwrap agreements arc TOS
that purport, by their own terms, to become binding against anyone using
the site. 111 The idea is that by "browsing" the site, the user enters a
contract, but this legal consequence need not be brought to the user's
attention either before or after browsing, and although the courts insist
that some "notice" be given of the ex istcnce of the terms supposedly
112
incorporated into this contractual arrangement, courts may not require
the terms to be located anywhere very conspicuous. Somewhere in the
TOS the online service provider will mention that merely using the
services indicates acceptance of all of the terms found in that TOS. Of
course, there arc various degrees of browscwrap terms; some arc well
hidden while others arc behind a clear and obvious link on a homcpagc
or even located several places on the website. ll.l
Despite the reality that consumers tend not to read these agreements,
courts have consistently upheld online standard form contracts, finding

I 09. s~c. c.g .. Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds. SurnT o/ the l.11>t of
Cl'h<'l'.\'f''"'": F.'lectronic ( 'ontracting ( ·us~s 2!1115-2!11)(i, 62 Bus. LAW. 195. 203 (2006) (arguing that
for an online agreement to satisfy traditional paper contract rules where no signature is required, the
terms must be visible enough to meet a "reasonable communicativcne"" test (citing Juliet '\1.
Moringicllo, Signals, Ass~nt onJ !ntanct Contracting. 57 RUT<ilcRS L. RI'V. 1307. 1337 40 (2005))).
I I 0. Si'i' in/i-o Part IV (discussing court treatment of click wrap agreements).
Ill. s~~ Major v. McCallister. 302 S.W.3d 227 (Mo. Ct. i\pp. 2009) (finding that a website
user was bound to a browsewrap agreement because there was explicit notice that terms existed and
that a person was bound to those terms by using the services. although the consumer was never
asked to click-to-accept).
112. Sec Specht v. Nctscapc Commc'ns Corp .. 306 f.Jd 17 (2d Cir. 2002). for a landmark
case discussing notice requirements t()f online agreements and, Register.com, Inc. v. Verio. Inc .. 35h
f.3d 393. 403 (2d Cir. 2004). which follows Specht in assuming the importance of notice in online
1tgrcc1nents.

113. Sec inji·a Part III. B.
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sufficient assent. 114 Professor Schmitz recently noted that the trend for
courts to hold consumers responsible for reading their contracts has the
effect of stripping the service provider of any duty to inform consumers
about specific strong terms within the agreement. 115 That is, if the
contract is going to be enforced whether or not it was read, there may not
be much motivation to make the contract conspicuous. If this is true, this
may be the reason that so many consumers in online contract dispute
cases did not merely fail to read the terms but actually claim they never
knew the terms existed in the first place.
B. Putting Your Foot in the Stirrup

Recently we conducted a study to identify trends in exactly what
"manifestations" were required for online contract formation. Our study
dissected the account creation process of eight common service
providers. These eight service providers are merely illustrations and they
arc not the most extreme or noteworthy examples we found. We chose
the service providers listed here only because they are key players in the
industry. We do not claim this study is comprehensive, nor docs it target
any of the service providers we suspect are the worst offenders. The
service providers included are: Gmail, 116 MSN, 117 Facebook, 11 s
Yahoo!, 119 Myspace, 120 cBay, 121 Twitter, 122 and Amazon. 123 The websites

114. E.g., see Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Or. 2002)
(explaining that consumers do have a responsibility to read their contracts and a mere failure to read
is not a valid defense to contract formation); University of Miami v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 166 F.
App'x 450 (lith Cir. 2006) (tailing to read the contract is no excuse); Great N. Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec.
Scrv., Inc., 517 r. Supp. 2d 723 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (same); Klopp v. Deere, 510 F. Supp. 807, 811
(E. D. Pa. 1981) (same); Schillachi v. Flying Dutchman Motorcycle Club, 751 F. Supp. 1169 (E. D.
Pa. 1990) (quoting 8 PENNSYLvANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA~ 83, page 82) ("It is common sense and
an accepted rule of law that a person has a duty to read the contract before executing it, and his
failure to do so will not excuse his ignorance of the contents."). For a discussion on the effect this
result is having on cncuraging consumers not to read contracts, see Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W.
McCann, Ignorance is Clicks (forthcoming).
115. Amy J. Schmitz. Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting
Arhitration Rcfimns. 15 IIARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 115, 125 (2010) (explaining "assent challenges tace
high hurdles because most courts agree that consumers arc responsible for reading their contracts
and there is no duty to inform customers explicitly about arbitration provisions" (citing Torrance,
242 F. Supp. 2d at 169- 70; Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive:
Enforcing Contractual Mvths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities. 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 617,
619 23 (2009))).
I 16. GMAIL, http://gmail.com (last visited Oct. 6, 20 I I).
117. MSN, http://www.msn.com (last visited Oct. 6, 20 II).
118. FACEHOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 6, 20 II).
I 19. Y AIIOO!. http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 6, 20 II).
120. MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com.(last visited Oct. 6, 2011 ).
121. EBAY, http://www.cbay.com (last visited Oct. 6, 20 II).
122. TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2011 ).
123. AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2011 ).
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we viewed contained both browsewrap and clickwrap contracts. Table I
below charts a variety of approaches to contract formation among the
eight wcbpagcs. Of the eight online service providers examined, none
require or allow actual assent to specific individual terms, even where
those terms are particularly onerous (i.e. arbitration agreements,
unilateral modification, non-transferability of rights, surrender of
intellectual property rights, etc.). Most, but not all, of the sites do,
however, require the consumer at least to click on some block or link
(which we refer to as a "button"). The buttons have variations in their
identification or text, some indicating only acknowledgment of account
creation. These distinctions arc discussed below in greater detail.
Ta bl e I Process o fA cceptmg or
n me c on tract T crms ofS erv1ce ('TOS")
"I Accept"
Button

Gmail

MSN

~

~

Face book

Yahoo'

Myspace

eBay

Twitter

~

Scroll Box

~

Separate Link

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~*

~

~*

~

~

~

~

~

~

toTOS

;\mazon

I

'i

~

Words
Indicating
What Is
Accepted
Notitication of
TOS Above

~

Button
Notitication of
TOS Below

~

~

~

Button
*In addition, the print is small and inconspicuous

Gmail, MSN, and cBay each have the words "I accept" on a button,
making it relatively obvious that a click demonstrates some sort of
agreement or consent. A more difficult question is the extent to which
the "I accept" is linked to a specific set of terms implicated by the click.
The studied service providers vary in how they provide access to their
respective TOS terms. Of these three that have an "I accept" button, only
Gmail contains the TOS agreement in a scroll box on the page where the
"I accept" button exists. This positioning means that the user is visually
confronted with typed language and a sense that there is more than the
opening sentence because a scroll bar is included. In addition, Gmail
provides another way to access the TOS in a larger window (rather than
using the small scroll box) with two different links identified as
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"printable version" and "Terms of Service" placed right above the "I
accept" button. MSN and eBay do not show the terms, but provide only a
hyperlink to another page with text. MSN places this hypcrlink right
above the "I accept" button. eBay places a hyperlink above the button as
well, but it includes three bits of the agreement ncar where a user clicks,
but the button reads "Continue." These include a representation that "I
am at least 18 years old." The inclusions of these three specifics creates
another issue since the user may think these arc the most important or
most onerous terms as their attention has been focused on them. This is a
powerful signal that the other terms are not important or are just
"standard," which for a consumer means "reasonable" and "minimal."
Facebook, Yahoo!, Myspace, and Twitter each require the consumer
to click a button that reads "create my account" or "sign up" rather than
"I accept." These service providers do not include a visual of the text of
the TOS on the page with the button, but only a separate link behind text
saying "Terms of Usc" or "Terms of Service." Yahoo! and Twitter have
a separate link directly above the "create my account" button and a
sentence stating that clicking the "create my account" button is
interpreted as acceptance to these terms. Both Faccbook and Myspace,
on the other hand, insert this notification and these links in very small
print below the "Create My Account" button. A person whose screen
shows the place to click would not necessarily have the other link and
sentence on the screen simultaneously or may easily stop scrolling the
screen at the point where the "create my account" click is required.
W c conducted this study of these eight service providers from the
perspective of an individual who is interested in becoming a member and
creating an online account. However, Myspace claims to expand the
authority of its TOS to "visitors" as well as members. 124 "Visitors" to the
site arc not presented with any language explaining this risk or the
service provider's intended consequence or any clearly identifiable
button on which to click, whether or not tied to a link to the text of the
terms. Myspace's TOS therefore has both clickwrap and browsewrap
aspects to the contracts it attempts to form on its webpagc.
Similar to Myspacc's treatment of "visitors," Amazon's treatment of
"members" not only omits language revealing that acceptance to terms
will occur by any particular act such as clicking, or has already occurred,
it also fails to notify the consumer when account creation itself has taken

124. Terms
of'
Use
Agreement.
MYSPACE
(June
25,
2009),
http://www.myspace.com/Hclp/Tenns (last visited Sep. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Myspace TOS]. The
Myspace TOS defines "visitors" as those who "simply browse the Myspace Services, including,
without limitation, through a mobile or other wireless device, or otherwise use the Myspace Services
without being registered." !d.
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place. 125 Rather, the consumer is invited to enter some information and
12
click a button that merely says ''Continuc." <' Nowhere during this dataentry stage is there any indication that a TOS exists or that the consumer
is accepting any terms. Once the consumer clicks the "Continue" button,
she is taken to a page welcoming the new customer to Amazon~ on this
page, there is still no notification that any terms exist or have been
accepted. However, on the very bottom of the page, in the middle of
almost two-dozen options of small hypcrlinkcd print is a fairly obscure
way for the truly determined to access the full text of an otherwise127
unidentified TOS agreement.
After following this to another page, on
the third line of the TOS, in bold print, Amazon declares, "fi]f you visit
,ps
.
..
or s hop at Amazon. com, you accept t hesc conelItlons.
- Notc t hat t Ius
claim includes visitors as well as those with existing accounts.
This sampling of eight wcbsitcs demonstrates that, even in cases
where the court might label the contract as a clickwrap, reasonable
Internet users may be unaware that they have entered a contract, not to
mention the content of its terms. The average consumer could easily pass
through the Amazon account creation process without ever thinking that
she has entered into a binding agreement. In the cases where it is more
obvious, it is still not farfetched to imagine that a consumer could easily
whiz through account creation without ever noticing a short sentence in
small print containing a hypcrlink to a TOS to which she will be bound.
Nonetheless, all of these service providers have a TOS full of terms that
limit the consumer's rights in significant ways.
The eight wcbsitcs discussed above were chosen at random without
reviewing their terms in advance. The terms these contain arc not out of
the ordinary for TOS across a wide variety of online service providers.
C. Content Viability and Mot iii~/ 'V
Many TOS arc full of terms that arc quite onerous and even
overreaching but arc not being thrown out by courts on the basis of
unconscionability. The problems to the consumer that come with these
powerful terms arc only magnified in the online context where
consumers arc even less cognizant that they arc agreeing to give up

I 25. i\MVO:\, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Oct. 6. 20 I I).
Because the consumer must actually provide personal information and click to "'continue"
to sec each part of this process. there is no working URL we can provide beyond the initial account
setup page. However. the reader can lind the beginning of the account setup process at i\mazon.com
under the link. "'New customer'' Start here."
I 27. i\MAZO~. supra note I 25.
I 26.

I2X. !d.
at
http://www.amazon.com/gp/hcl picustomer/displa y .html/rct'- l(>otcr cou''ie lJTf'X &nodcl d- 50XOXX.
I 29. See Pre-Pure hose VC'tcriiWIT !::rams. supra note I 05.
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significant rights. We briefly highlight a handful of common provisions
found in TOS agreements. 130
1. Unilateral modification
Of particular note is a common but onerous right to unilateral
modification. Generally, after a contract is formed, for proper contract
modification to occur the agreement to modify the "contract must satisfy
all the criteria essential for a valid original contract, including offer,
acceptance, and consideration. Hence, one party to a contract may not
unilaterally alter its terms." 131 Nonetheless, many TOS agreements
contain terms eliminating the consumer's rights in this area, granting the
service provider full power to alter the TOS without going through the
steps required for a "valid original contract." 132 Of course, in doing so,
the online service provider docs not allow the consumer the same luxury
of changing the contract at will, but instead retains the unilateral
modification power exclusively for itself. These unilateral modification
clauses have become more common in TOS and courts have responded
to them in a variety of ways, often enforcing them, even where the online
service provider reserves no obligation to inform the consumer of the
unilateral changes. 133
When an online service provider reserves the right to modify the
terms of an agreement unilaterally, it grants itself an almost unlimited
contracting power. Utilizing this one contract term is akin to using one
wish to wish for infinite additional wishes. At least one commentator has
argued that unilateral modification clauses make the other promises in
the contract completely illusory, as this term essentially asserts that the
online service provider will only be bound to the terms in the TOS for as

130. For a more detailed discussion of the types of terms commonly found in TOS
agreements. sec Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of" Web Site Terms of" Use Agreements.
26 HAMLIN!' L. REV. 499 (2003); Florcncia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of"
Standard Form Contracts: The Case oj"Sofiware License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LFGAL STUD.
447 (200S).

131. 17 A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts ~ 507 (20 10).
132. !d.
133. For a discussion on several examples of online service providers using unilateral
modification clauses and court responses to these clauses, see David Horton, The Shadow Terms:
Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2010). Horton's article
notes various types of unilateral modification clauses and the varying degrees of obligations the
online service provider retains in informing the consumer of changes. Some online service providers,
for example, have sent regular communication to consumers, offering a grace period in which the
consumer may reject contract changes, while others simply alter the terms and leave it up to the
consumer to notice the changes. !d ln one case with AT&T, the online service provider had altered
its terms so frequently that by the time litigation over the services ensued, not even AT &T's lawyers
were sure which terms actually applied. !d. at 605 06.
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long as the online service provider decides not to change those terms. Jl.l
Not surprisingly, commentators have observed the increasingly
aggressive usc of this tactic by online service providers as courts have
become willing to enforce unilateral modification clauses. m
We found these clauses in our study. Myspace's TOS notes,
"Myspacc reserves the right to modify this Agreement at any time ....
Your continued use of the Myspacc Services following any such
modification constitutes your agreement to be bound by and your
116
acceptance of the Agreement as so modificd."
The Myspacc TOS
further explains that it is the consumer's obligation to read the TOS
regularly to make sure she sti II agrees to all of the tcrms. 117 Because there
is no promise within the TOS that Myspacc will provide any notice of
changes, m Myspace has granted itself authority to alter any term at any
time without providing notice. 139 Enforced literally, this provision
essentially means that Myspace could insert in its TOS enji:Jrceah/e terms
anywhere from requiring an unsuspecting consumer to begin paying fees
for certain kinds of posts 140 to requiring any claim against Myspace be
brought within ninety days. The consumer is supposedly bound by these
new terms as soon as she enters the site following a change. For a
conscientious user, logging on each time would require re-reading the
terms and comparing them to the prior draft.
Twitter contains a similar provision to the one found in the Myspace
TOS but explains that Twitter will notify the consumer if it, in its "sole
discretion," deems the modification to be "material." 141 The Amazon
TOS contains a modification clause with essentially the same practical
effect as the one found in Twitter's contract. 14 " No explanation ot~ or
I 34. Michael L. DeMichele & Richard A. Bales. l!ni/ulemi-Modijiculion l'mr·isions in
Fmplomwnr Arhirrarion Agreements. 24llmSTRA LAil. & EM I'. L..l. 63 (200h).
135. !lorton, supra note 133; Kl't\T D. STLJCKI'Y. hTI·.Rt\I'T -~"llO~I.I'<L LA\\~ 1.02[.5j(d)
(2011) (arguing that unilateral modification clauses arc becoming so popular hecuuse courts arc
enforcing them); Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Fmprr• Promises, X4 S. C\1. L. Rl·\. I (2010)
(opining that consumers arc generally clueless about the risks of unilateral moditication clauses and
that even if they were aware, they could not do much about them as courts arc upholding them and
they arc too pervasive in TOS to avoid).
136. Myspacc TOS, supra note 124.

137. !d.
13X. !d.
139. !d.
140. Interestingly, Faccbook's TOS explicitly states that it docs "not guarantee'" that its
services "will always be ti·ec." S'rutement o( Rights und Responsihiliries, FACI'IJOOK (April 2h,
2011 ), http://www.ftccbook.comiterms.php (last visited Scp. 22,2011) [hercinalter htccbook TOS].
141. Terms ojSerricc. TwiTTER (June I, 2011 ). http://twittcr.com/tos (last visited Scp. 2011)
[hcrcinaticr Twitter TOS].
142. Conditions of' Use, AMAZON (Aug. 19, 2011), http:/;www.amazon.com/agrecmcnt' (last
visited Sep. 2011) [hcreinaticr Ama7on TOS] (select "Conditions of Usc'" at the bottom ofthe page)
(explaining that Amazon "rescrvc[s] the right to make changes to [its] site. policies, and these
Conditions of Usc at any time.").
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boundaries on, such discretion is given in the terms or on the webpages.
These unilateral modification clauses add a critical layer to the
problems of lack of notice and unequal bargaining power. Not only are
the consumers likely unaware that such a term exists, most would not
understand its full implications even if it were printed in red text on the
home page. Whatever fiction courts believe about clicking as an
indication of consent (or opening an account as an indication of consent
to terms), surely no rational consumer intends to give knowing assent to
anything the service providers deems to impose now or in the future
without notice.
If the service provider can change the contract at will, why bother to
call it a contract at all? Call it what it is: not private ordering but private
imposition-the unfettered right of online service providers to dictate to
anyone who visits their site any legal limitations, conditions, and
responsibilities it elects from time to time.

2. Jury waivers, venue restrictions, and arbitration clauses
Jury waivers, venue restrictions, and arbitration clauses are also
commonly found in TOS agreements. The Myspace TOS, for example,
contains a term acknowledging that the consumer waives all rights to
trial by jury for any litigation resulting from the use of its services and
143
further restricts all conflict resolution to the jurisdiction of New York.
cBay explains that by accepting its TOS, the consumer agrees to resolve
any dispute either in "the courts located within Santa Clara County" or
through arbitration if the claim is under $10,000. 144 The Amazon TOS
contains a term subjecting the consumer to personal jurisdiction in the
state of Washington and demanding that all disputes will be settled
within Washington courts. 145
Naturally a TOS creates an opportunity for service providers to
choose locations and dispute resolution mechanisms that arc most
economical for them, and part of the economics of the provider's
decisions may come down to choosing the options that discourages the
wcatcst number of consumers from pursuing claims. Although
arbitration clauses arc generally enforceable, no one suggests such
clauses arc not material and of extraordinary consequences. In the TOS
context the seriousness of such clauses is vastly magnified by the
increased failures of notice and broad interpretations of what actions
constitute contractual consent.
143. Myspace TOS. supra note 124.
144. Your User Agreement, EBAY (Sept. 7. 201 0). http://pages.cbay.com/he1p/po1icies/useragreement.htm1.
145. Amazon TOS. supra note 142.
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3. Transferability and rights oj"survivorship
Some TOS prohibit transferability and rights of survivorship.
Accompanying some of these restrictions arc statements granting power
to the online service providers to permanently delete account content in
certain circumstances. For example, Yahoo! 's TOS explains that Yahoo!
will not engage in transferring contents or granting access upon the death
of the account holdcr. 146 As a result, Yahoo! has the right to delete any
147
contents upon notice of death according to its TOS.
Additionally, all
14
rights to the Yahoo! ID arc extinguished upon dcath. x Similarly, MSN's
TOS notes that upon termination or cancellation of an account by either
149
party, MSN may permanently delete any of the consumer's contcnt.
While many users may want all content deleted upon death, many
would not want this result and would be stunned to discover the
application of such a clause. Information about banking and other
accounts, pending business commitments, reservations or schcdul cs, and
similar information may be critical to surviving spouses, partners, and
employers when a person suddenly is taken.

4. Creative rights
Common, particularly among social networking sites, arc terms in
the TOS noting that the user grants rights to content posted on the site,
which can be used by the online service provider. For example,
Faccbook explains that "ff]or content that is covered by intellectual
property rights, like photos and videos (IP content), you specifically give
us the following permission . . . : you grant us a non-exclusive,
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to usc any IP
content that you post on or in connection with Faccbook." t)o Further
Faccbook mentions, "[ w ]c always appreciate your feedback or other
suggestions about Faccbook, but you understand that we may usc them
151
without any obligation to compensate you for thcm."
Twitter contains essentially the same term, listing a few ways Twitter
may usc content posted on its site: "By submitting, posting or displaying
Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, nonexclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to usc, copy,
146. Yuhoo 1
Terms
ol
Sen·ice.
http:! /i ntc>.yahoo.com/lcgal/u s/yahoo/utos/utos-173 .html.

Y 111100 1

(Nov.

24.

200X).

147. !d.
14X. !d.
149. Microsoji Sen·icc Agreement. MSN (Aug. 3 I. 20 I 0), http://explorc.livc.com, microsottscrvi ce-a grcemenf' mkt -cn-u s.
150. Sec Facebook TOS, supra note 140.
151. ld

I]

UNWRAPPING

27

reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and
distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods
(now known or later developcd)." 152
5. Comparing a real horse to a virtual horse

Courts have found increasingly less conscious forms of notice and
assent to be binding online, while seemingly ignoring the characteristics
of online transactions that suggest contract doctrine should be even more
tightly applied online than in the real world. As Professor Preston
explained in detail elsewhere, the Internet creates circumstances that arc
different from traditional real world contracting and that carry
significance in any meaningful discussion of the enforceability of
TOS. 153 For instance, the ease with which online service providers can
store terms electronically encourages these contract drafters to include as
much language as possible. As Professor Hillman has argued, consumers
may choose online transactions because they want the result immediately
and are accustomed to the speed of the Internet; thus they arc less likely
to stop to read and evaluate the fine print. 154
There are no space concerns that pressure online service providers to
keep the terms to a minimum or to be more concise with term
explanations. Further, because consumers do not actually sec or hold a
tangible contract when transacting online, they miss out on the
cautionary function that being handed a heavy stack of terms might
provide; thus, again, online service providers are not motivated to cut
back terms for fear that a consumer will balk at the vast number of words
or pages in the contract. Typically this interest is balanced against the
contract drafter's interest in including as many limiting terms beneficial
to the drafter as possible.
Additionally, contracting in general has evolved so drastically over
the last two decades that acceptance of an agreement may no longer have
the same significance as it did pre-Intcrnct. 155 Consumers are entering
into contracts on such a regular basis that it is no longer a significant
event to assent to an agreement, as it may have been before products and
services became so available through the Internet. And beyond the sheer
number of contracts, the lack of formalities in contract acceptance online
152. Twitter TOS. supra note 141.
153. For a more detailed discussion of these differences, see Preston, supra note I 02.
154. Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Wehsite Disclosure of" EStandard Tams Backfire!, I 04 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006 ).
155. Susan E. Gindin, Nohodv Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons
Learned and Questions Raised hy the FTC's Action Against Sears, 8 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
I. 7, 24 (2009) (noting that consumers do not read online contracts and understand what they
contain): Hillman, supra note 154, at 840-904.
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further strip the consumer of awareness she may have had in traditional
paper contracting where the parties might drive to a meeting-place,
thumb through documents, and apply a physical signature. Rather, with
online contracting, the consumer can sit at her computer in her sweats
and immediately begin using online services by merely clicking a button.
Little time or effort is involved during which a customer might
reconsider. Even if she did take the time and effort to read through the
agreement, she docs not have much chance of finding someone who can
explain it and less chance of negotiating any changes.
IV. CURRENT COURTS UNDER WRAPS
Emerging from the early clickwrap and browsewrap cases and
commentary is a general consensus that signing an agreement or
otherwise explicitly declaring assent is unnecessary so long as there is
sufficient notice of terms and sufficient opportunity to read those terms.
In assessing how courts have applied economic efficiency concerns to
online contracting, Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst. L.L.C.
explained in 2007, "[t]hough the outcomes in [browscwrap] cases arc
mixed, one general principle that emerges is that the validity of a
browscwrap license turns on whether a website user has actual or
constructive knowledge of a site's terms and conditions prior to using the
sitc." 151' Courts have applied this analysis to clickwrap agreements as

wcll.ts7
When Judge Sotomayor handed down her opinion in Specht in 2002,
she explained that the enforceability of these agreements could really
only be justified where the user should reasonably know what she is
15
doing when she enters the site or clicks to accept. x This caution has
eroded over the last decade, however, as courts have become more and
more comfortable with enforcing online agreements almost regardless of
the conspicuousness of terms.

A. The Case Law
The early courts quickly scrambled to identify whether there was
proper notice as the basis for finding proper formation. But recently
many courts and commentators seem to be willing to go even a step
further by assuming the notice is inherent in any typical clickwrap
agreement. That is, many courts seem willing today to accept as a
156. No. 06-CV-OK91-H. 2007 WL 4K23761. at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12. 2007).
157. See Specht v. Nctscapc Commc'ns Corp .. 306 r:.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Rcgistcr.com. Inc.
v. Vcrio. Inc., 356 £'.3d 393.403 (2d. Cir. 2004).
IS X. Specht. 306 c..ld at 29.
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baseline that people should just generally be on notice that TOS exist
when they interact online and thus clickwraps are presumably
enforceable unless strong evidence to the contrary is shown. Some courts
state this presumption by merely declaring clickwrap agreements to be
generally enforceable and moving on to address other issues in the
case. 159 Others also use this presumption as a baseline but try to go a step
further by attempting to explain why clickwrap agreements are or should
. I y va I'd
1 . 16o
bc presumptive
Some of these cases claim to qualify their acceptance of clickwrap
agreements by explaining under which circumstances clickwrap
agreements arc enforceable, but the explanation virtually encompasses
all clickwraps anyway. 161 For example, in August 2011 a district court in
California declared the state of the law according to "recent case law" to
be that access to terms plus "requiring a user to affirmatively accept the
terms, even if the terms arc not presented on the same page as the
acceptance button, are sufficient." 162 A closer look at this explanation
proves that this court merely stated the standard definition of a
159. See. e.g .. Centrifugal Force, Inc. v. Softnet Commc'n, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5463(CM)
(GWG), 2011 WL 744732, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. I, 2011) ("In New York, clickwrap agreements are
valid and enforceable contracts." (citing Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.3d 91,92 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002))); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957 JS!l, 2011 WL 797505, at *6 n.S (D.
Conn. Feb. 24, 20 II) ("Ciickwrap contracts are ubiquitous and have been consistently upheld by
courts." (quoting Specht, 306 F.3d at 26)); Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369
(S.D. Fla. 2011) ('"In Florida and the federal circuits . . clickwrap agreements are valid and
enforceable contracts."' (quoting Salco Distribs., L.L.C. v. iCodc, Inc., No. 8:05 CV 642 T 27TGW,
2006 WL 449156, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2006))); Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d
1213 (D. Haw. 2010) (citing a number of cases since the early 2000s to establish that across the
country, clickwrap agreements arc generally enforceable); Meier v. Midwest Recreational
Clearinghouse, L.L.C., No.2: I 0-cv-0 I 026-MCE-GGH, 2010 WL 2738921 (E. D. Cal. July 12, 2010)
(forum selection clause in TOS is not invalid simply because it is in a clickwrap agreement;
clickwrap agreements have been consistently held to be enforceable by courts in recent years);
Exceptional Urgent Care Ctr. I, Inc. v. Protomed Med. Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:0S-cv-284-0c-IOGRJ,
2009 WL 1370818, at *I 0 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2009) ("There is also no dispute over the validity of
click wrap agreements .... "); Jackson v. Am. Plaza Corp., No. 08 Civ. 8980 (PKC), 2009 WL
1158829 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2X, 2009) (assuming that clickwrap agreements are generally enforceable
and no one argues that point anymore).
160. Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., L.L.C., No. 10 C 2675, 2011 WL 2632727, at *15
(N.D. Ill. July 5, 20 I I) ("Because clickwrap agreements require affirmative action on the part of the
user to manifest assent, courts regularly uphold their validity when challenged." (citing Ronald J.
Mann & Travis Siebeneicher. Just One Click: The Reali~v of Internet Retail Contracting, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 984, 990 (2008))); Hoftinan v. Supplements Togo Mgmt. L.L.C., IS A. 3d 210 (N.J.
Super. A.D. 20 II) (stating that most courts assume that click wrap agreements arc enforceable so
long as there is a button with some indication that says that one accepts by clicking).
161. Grosvenor v. Quest Commc'ns Intern., Inc., No. 09-cv-2848-WDM-KMT, 2010 WL
3906253, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 20 I 0) ("As a rule, a clickwrap is valid where the terms of the
agreement appear on the same screen with the button the user must click .... " (citing Mortg. Plus,
Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2582-GTV-DJW, 2004 WL 2331918 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2004)));
Beard v. Paypal, Inc., No. 09-1339-JO, 2010 WL 654390 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2010) (stating that
clickwrap agreements are generally entixceablc absent a showing of rraud).
162. Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C-09-5443 EDL, 2011 WL 3419499, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011 ).
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clickwrap. Thus, this court suggests that clickwrap agreements arc valid
only if they arc clickwrap agreements.
Note, however, that while the majority of courts across the country
tend to follow this pattern of thinking, some still hold strong to the
Specht analysis and arc willing to throw out online agreements that arc
not conspicuously noticed and entered. In May 201 L one New Jersey
court held that the online service provider did not sufficiently make its
contract available when it buried the link at the bottom of a scroll
163
pagc. But courts willing to invalidate any click wrap arc rare.
Looking at the click wrap and browscwrap cases for 2009 through
20 II, there is an obvious and dramatic trend for courts to agree that
people should generally be aware that TOS exist and therefore everyone
has ''constructive" notice that terms arc there somewhere. While
consumers, if quizzed, would probably acknowledge that most web
pages have terms somewhere, imposing a duty to hunt them out or bear
the consequences of whatever they might say seems unreasonable. Think
of the havoc such a doctrine would work in a wide variety of cases. For
instance, under traditional contract law where a private individual offers
a reward for information, a person cannot accept that reward without an
11 4
awareness of the offer at the time she provides the information. ' This
rule means an enforceable contract for the reward docs not form even
though an individual gives information, an objective manifestation that
looks like acccptancc. 165 The result in these cases would be nonsensical if
courts could impute knowledge that there may be a reward offered
somewhere. Under this principle, unknowing "consent" should not be
acceptance of a TOS either.
While the majority of courts continue to suspect that the reasonable
consumer should know that terms exist, one commentator recently
argued that there arc circumstances in which consumers cannot rationally
be expected to fathom that they have entered into an agreement by
11 6
performing certain actions. ' A prime example of this is the Googlc TOS
that purportedly binds all consumers who merely conduct a Googlc
search. "ft seems farcical that the general public would believe that each
of those searches would bind a person to a contract," given that the TOS
163. l!offinan, IX i\.3dat210.
164. Glover v. Jewish War Veterans, 6X i\.2d 233,234 (D.C. i\pp. 1949) ("[i\]t least so fi1r as
private rewards arc concerned, there can be no contract unless the claimant when giving the desired
inti.mnation knew of the offer of the reward and acted with the intention of accepting such offer").
165. Sec, <'.g., Gasdcn Times v. Doc, 345 So. 2d 1361 (Ala. Civ. J\pp. 1977): Consul.
Prcightways Corp. v. Williams. 22X S.E.2d 230 (<ia. i\pp. 1976): <J/m·cr. !>X i\.2d at 234: Porsythc \.
Murnane, 129 N.W. 134 (Minn. 1911). ;\minority of states have created exceptions to the general
nile that allow individuals to collect a reward without having knowledge at the time int(mnation was
offered. Sci', i'.g_. Eagle v. Smith, 9 Del. (I !I oust.) 293 (Del. Super. Ct. IX71 ).
166.
the

David /\. Puckett, T!'rms oj'S!'rvicc and the Co!llf!Uter Froud and Ahu.l'i' Act· .I Traj! jo1·
J. L. & T!Tit. 53 (20 II).
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is not even found on Googlc's home page. 167 And the author humorously
points out, "[o]ne could certainly use Googlc to search for Googlc's
TOS, but this solution seems to put the cart before the horse." 168
B. The Constraining Doctrines

Notwithstanding the quite obvious trend of the cases in the last three
years, some scholars and many practitioners have trouble believing that
courts are really enforcing material terms in TOS. We want to believe
that where doctrines exist, courts must be applying them as balance
against the economic might of powerful market players. Specifically, if
unconscionability doctrine and requirements of assent arc recognized in
the Restatement, the U.C.C., old case law, and more law review articles
than anyone could ever read, there is a natural tendency to assume that
this necessarily means courts arc using these safeguards. But apparently
they have become obsolete.
This trust is reflected in a 2002 article by Professor Hillman, a
prominent legal scholar who then believed courts were doing an adequate
job policing these contracts. 169 A decade ago things looked a bit
different. Specifically, Hillman asserted that "contract law has responded
effectively to the problcm[s associated with standard form contracts] by
following Karl Llewellyn's conception to enforce bargained-for terms
and conscionable boilerplate provisions, while barring egregious
terms." 11 Consistent with this proposition, Hillman later notes in the
same article that "[ c]ourts generally find unconscionability either when
the bargaining process is deficient or the substantive terms are
oppressive, although the strongest and most persuasive cases involve
both." 171 Professor Hillman only cites two sources. One source is a 2002
case out of California discussing unconscionability; but it finds the
disputed term to be conscionable. 172 The other source is not a case, but
rather it is his own article from 1981 that make~ many of the same
assertions that are readdressed in his 2002 article. 173 A decade later, we
have found no evidence that courts are regularly throwing out TOS terms

°

167. !d. (citing Coogle Homepage, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Oct. 13,
2010)).
168. !d.
169. Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 743 (2002).
170. !d. (cmphasi' added).
I 71. !d. at 749.
172. Bischotl v. DirectTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d I 097, II 07 (C. D. Cal. 2002) (tinding an
arbitration clause in a consumer agreement to be cntorceable in an unconscionability dispute).
173. Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths Ahout Unconscionahility: A New Framework
for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELl. L. REV. I, 30 ( 1981) (discussing the purpose and application
ofunconscionability in contract disputes, generally).
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for procedural or substantive unconscionability-or both. In fact, we
174
have found the opposite.
What all of this means is that a practitioner, consumer, or small
business owner who has either learned or recently read about possible
defenses to formation or enforceability may be surprised to find that
these theories arc hardly defenses at all in 2012. Courts arc not only
shying away from finding anything to be unconscionable, they arc also
finding these online agreements to be presumptively enforceable unless
the party can show some kind of highly abnormal conduct. m And so
long as online service providers continue to uniformly insert
overreaching terms in clickwrap agreements, the community conception
of "standard" terms begins to conform. A consumer becomes less and
less able to argue that anything extreme or abnormal has taken place
when an online service provider asserts a unilateral modification, an
obscure arbitration clause, or some other painful term she did not
anticipate.

V. CONCLUSION
Contract law is treading a path away from rcqumng explicit
manifestations of assent for contract formation and reasonable
boundaries on undickcrcd terms. Online service providers write
increasingly powerful terms and insert them in cvcr-srnallcr-hypcrlinkcd
beasts of elaborate and lengthy TOS and assert that any click. or opening
the page, means intent to be bound.
Like Lord Mansfield, Judge Easterbrook resolves cases on policies
rather than law. m Like Lord Mansfield, he has become something of a
pop icon in law and many judges apparently feel compelled to follow
177
him just as scholars arc compelled to cite him, even if they disagree.
Of course, he is not the only judge with strong economic driven
sentiments, but he has become something of a figurehead for the
movement that has led us to underestimate the risks of private Ia w.
In another context, Professor O'Mclinn dramatically combines three
17
themes: return to feudalism, horses, and Judge Easterbrook. x While we

174. Si!i!SUf!I"U notes 159 61 (citing cases upholding clickwraps).
175. Su: supra note 159 (citing a number of cases where courts recently have accepted as a
base-line that click wrap agreements arc cnfixccablc).
176. Sec supra note I 0.
177. Sec supra Part ll.C (discussing this phenomenon with both Lord Manslield and Judge
Easterbrook).
17X. Limn Seamus ()"Mclinn. Sofiwarc and Shm·l!!s: 1/m,· the lnti!llcctual Pmj)('l"tl· Rc\'()11/tion
is Undermining Trmlitional Concepts of'Propatl·. 76 U. Cl1\. L. RFV. 14.\ (2007). This article is a
challenge to the purported "'war on peer to peer" and the role of Judge Easterbrook·, jurisprudence in
designating property rights.
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may differ some on the importance of copyright protection and other
details, the juxtaposition of these themes is delightfully stated in this
short excerpt:
Judge Easterbrook has famously declared that there was no law of the
horse ... and there should likewise be no law of the computer. The
irony could not be greater, for there was once an extremely important
law of the horse-"feudalism" ... -and Judge Easterbrook is the most
famous of a number of jurists who are fashioning a new law of the
horse tor the computer age.
Judge Easterbrook cannot be taken at his word. Posturing as the
champion of freedom of contract, he blithely imposed an onerous
licensing agreement on Matthew Zeidenberg---one to which
Zeidenberg had not agreed ....
The nobility who stood atop European society in the middle ages were
horsemen whose superiority was marked by hardware .... The horse
soldier had to have stirrups, which afforded him unprecedented control
over his mount and made him indispensable to Europe's monarchs.
Fighting on horses was an expensive business; horses were themselves
costly, they had to be replaced when they were killed, they required
large quantities of food, and the armor which the chevalier wore was
costly. The result was the development of an exceptional class [over]
those who did not have the money to own and equip a horse. 179
Those with money, ergo market clout, increase their power through the
usc of "private law." That kind of power needs to be reined in by the
interests of others, and this is the duty of government and courts. We arc
not arguing for increasing government, heaven forbid. We arc arguing
for courts to remember that established law docs not justify the unbridled
run of wild adhesion contracts. The thinking that accompanied the
acceptance of adhesion contracts included a reasonable corral beyond
which they could not stray.
The appropriate corral, broad enough to allow room to roam but with
ultimate boundaries, can be readily envisioned from part of the Supreme
10
Court's opinion in Carnival Cruise v. Shute R -a part that seems to be
doomed to obscurity. The Court, at least in lip service, acknowledges that
1 1
the boundaries arc notice and "fundamental fairness." R Notice harkens
to the procedural prong of unconscionability and fundamental fairness
captures the substantive prong.
This "fundamental fairness" balance also resonates in the doctrine of
unconscionability and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) on
Standardized Agreements. The concept of fairness commensurate with
179. !d. (citing LYNN WHITE, JR., MEDIEVAL TECHNOLOGY & SCXIAL CHANGE 1 38 (1962)).
180. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 ( 1991 ).
181. !d. at 595.
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reasonable expectations touches on both the notice given of online
contracts and the content of terms.
A telling illustration of our thesis is that Judge Easterbrook refers in
ProCD v. Zeidenherg to § 211 but only the language from Official
Comment "a" without reference to the part on restraints on
12
cnforccmcnt. x Unquestionably this cited language describes the merits
ofthe TOS horse, but Judge Easterbrook wholly ignores the other half of
the two-part principle-the corral that was intended to provide
boundaries for the horse-as evidenced in § 211 (3). Judge Easterbrook
docs not quote Official Comment f:
Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and
are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard terms
in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the
range of reasonable expectation. A debtor who delivers a check to his
creditor with the amount blank does not authorize the insertion of an
· f'm1te
· fi1gure. I Xl·
m

Further, he docs not discuss how the "terms after formation" process fits
with this sentence in Comment f: "The inference is reinforced if the
adhering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is
illegible or otherwise hidden from view." As discussed above, we do not
here dispute the result in ProCD. Zcidenbcrg should have realized that he
was cheating the system. We do dispute the callous treatment of contract
law in the case, particularly given the currency it has received and the
breadth with which it is applied.
We conclude with Karl Llewellyn's ever-thoughtful rumination (and
an interesting note on what marriage meant in 1939 before the divorce
revolution):
[CJoncept[sJ of contracts "of adhesion" ... turn attention ... lto the]
reality of consent: if one must take or leave l tenns] in block, and needs
to take, has he "assented"? It is with a sound instinct that many writers
have been impelled to answer: Yes. But that merely sets the problem.
You take or leave your marriage agreement, pretty much in block: you
"adhere," you do not "bargain." The point is that when that is the type
of choice and the only type of choice really available. it has heen and

still is the law's husiness. and in a case-law svstem. the jw(!;e.1· ·. to see
that the hlock to which vmt are indeed assenting as a tran.wction is
carved into some approximation of decent hala nee in its detail . ... [A J
block of terms which is not individualized to the bargainors ... needs

I X2. "Standardi7ation of agreements serves many of the same functions as standardi?ation of
goods and services; both are essential to a ~ystem of mass production and distribution. Scarce and

costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than the details of individual
transactions." ProCD \'. Zcidenberg. X6 FJd 1447. 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting RI·SIXII.'vll·'\1
(SH'OND) 01 CoNTRACTS ~ 211 cmt. a (I 9~ I)).
I XJ. RFS IJ\ITMFNT (S!CO'IIl) 01 CONTRACTS ~ 21 I(.\) cmt. f (I 9X I).
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reestablishment of[ a] type of balance .... " 1x4
Has this concept of "decent balance" been wholly slashed from the law?
A reading of current clickwrap and browsewrap terms and cases
enforcing them seems to suggest it has.

1X4. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 703 n.7 (the emphasized part was quoted as a preamble to this
Article).

